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This paper uses national household survey data to examine changes in real per capita incomes in South
Africa between 1993 and 2008; the start and the end of the first fifteen years of post-apartheid South
Africa. These data show an increase in average per capita real incomes across the distribution. Over
this period growth has been shared, albeit unequally, across almost the entire spectrum of incomes.
However, kernel density estimations make clear that these real income changes are not dramatic and
inequality has increased. We conduct a series of semi-parametric decompositions in order to understand
the role of endowments and changes in the returns to these endowments in driving these observed
changes in the income distribution. This analysis highlights the positive role played by changes in
endowments such as access to education and social services over the period. If these endowment changes
were all that changed in South Africa over the post-apartheid period, we would have seen a pervasive
rightward shift of the distribution of per capita real incomes. In the rest of the paper we explore why
this did not happen.
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Measuring South African economic growth since the fall of Apartheid is a tricky business.
One can simply measure GDP per capita and there the picture is a bright one. Real
GDP per capita since the democratic elections in 1994 has risen an average of close to
1.5 percent per year. Individuals, though, can't really spend GDP when they go to the
store. Rather, they spend their incomes. One can instead measure individual incomes,
but this measure too is problematic. Examining the distribution of individual incomes
will typically not speak to the welfare of the roughly 40 percent of South Africans age
18 and younger. In this paper, we measure incomes at the household level (adjusting
for household size.) This measure encompasses all household members, even those not
participating in the labor market, while still capturing a measure of economic welfare at
the level of individuals. Our reasoning is that to the extent that real household per capita
incomes increase, households are generally economically better o in a narrow but well-
dened sense. With real household per capita income as our metric, we measure economic
growth in South Africa from 1993 to 2008.
Our approach is a very microeconomic one. We rely on two nationally representative sur-
veys of individuals. Our data, though, do not make up a panel, as such longitudinal data
simply do not exist over the time period under consideration. Rather, we have used na-
tionally representative household surveys from 1993 and 2008 and meticulously matched
denitions of incomes so that we are condent that the temporal comparisons are valid.
Because we rely on micro-data, we are able to both measure the changes in incomes and
investigate what explains these changes. Additionally, we are able to examine changes
throughout the entire distribution rather than focusing simply on a mean or median. We
do so using relatively new nonparametric techniques augmented by more traditional para-
2metric estimates.
Whether the news is good or bad surely depends on one's prior and the previous evidence
is suciently diverse that it's hard to know just what constitutes a happy story. As noted
above, the national income accounts tell a story of success. While the macroeconomy has
shown robust growth over most of the past 15 years, it has been a period of relatively little
job growth and unemployment has increased dramatically. Depending on the measure used,
unemployment has increased from around 15 percent to well over 30 percent. Exactly how
the growth in GDP together with the rise in unemployment has impacted households is
something of an open question. In an earlier paper, we document that the rst ve years
after the new government (from 1995 to 2000) saw real individual incomes decline almost
forty percent. See Leibbrandt, Levinsohn and McCrary (2010c). Hoogeveen and Ozler
(2004) also found the the rst ve years after transition were especially tough on the poor
as poverty increased and household expenditures at the lower end of the distribution fell in
real terms. With the recent release of a new nationally representative income survey, the
dismal but provisional picture painted by these earlier studies merits revisiting.1
In the next section, we describe our data. Section 3 describes the changes in real incomes
from 1993 to 2008. Section 4 investigates what underlies these changes, while Section 5
concludes.
1Using much of the same data that we employ in this paper, Leibbrandt, Woolard, Finn and Argent
(2010b) examined the changes in inequality and poverty from 1993 to 2008. They found that inequality
had increased while aggregate poverty had declined slightly. The authors did nd some hopeful trends in
indicators of non-monetary well-being (e.g. access to piped water, electricity, and formal housing.)
32 The Data
2.1 The 1993 Data
We benchmark incomes at transition using the LSMS household survey conducted by the
World Bank in 1993. This survey is well-vetted and has been used by many researchers;
including Case and Deaton (1998), Duo (2003), and Thomas (1996). The survey was
nationally representative and included about 44,000 individuals comprising just over 8800
households. One reason for this survey's widespread use is that it serves as a benchmark
for what South Africa looked like on the eve of transition. Also, this survey has not been
subject to some of the criticisms leveled at a plausible substitute survey, the 1995 Income
and Expenditure Survey. We have elected to simply bypass that issue by using the 1993
LSMS survey.
Rather than using the widely available and easily downloaded merged version of the 1993
data, we have gone back to the original source data. We have done so because we want
to be condent that our comparisons to 2008 are valid. This means making sure that
every component of income is comparably dened in each of the two surveys{ something
we have taken great care to do. For this reason, we do not include imputed housing in our
measurement of imputed income.
Especially for poorer households, the value of housing can represent a substantial fraction
of real income. Most households do not report the value of the ow of housing they receive
from their residence when they own it. It is of course possible to impute the value of
housing and indeed one of us was responsible for this task for the current National Income
Dynamics Survey. If we could be condent that the housing imputation used in 2008 (which
we designed) could be applied to the 1993 data to construct a housing value that would
4then be comparable to that used in 2008, we would do so. Because we are not able to do
this, we strip housing out of our income measures for 2003 and 2008. We note, though,
that if we include housing using the probably non-comparable denitions from 1993 and
2008, we nd larger increases in household per-capita income.
2.2 The 2008 data
The most recent nationally representative income data for South Africa come from the rst
wave of the National Income Dynamic Survey (NIDS.) This survey, like the 1993 survey,
is publicly available, free, and readily downloadable.2 We use Wave 1 of the NIDS. These
data were collected in 2008 and comprise the initial wave of what will be a national panel
study. As was the case with the 1993 data, we use the original source data and then
construct aggregates so as to ensure comparability with the 1993 data.
The 2008 NIDS includes data on 28,225 individuals comprising 7305 households. As noted
above, we exclude the value of housing from our denition of income. The data include
detailed expenditure data as well as income data. We focus in this paper on the latter.
2.3 Why log household per-capita income?
Throughout this paper, our analysis is focused on what happened to incomes at the house-
hold level. We have made this decision for a couple of reasons. First, we are trying to cap-
ture what happened to economic welfare at a national level using micro data. The obvious
alternative to a household-level analysis is an individual-level analysis. An individual-level
analysis has some advantages. It allows the researcher to investigate issues of income re-
2See http://www.datarst.uct.ac.za/home/index.php?/Metadata-and-Data-Downloads to obtain the
source data.
5cipiency and to better understand how the labor market works (or not). The drawbacks
to the individual-level analysis are that it excludes children (who comprise almost half the
population) and, if one elects to work with log incomes as is often done, the analysis ex-
cludes all those adults who did not receive income. The recipiency issue can be addressed
with careful econometric analysis, but the exclusion of children is part-and-parcel of any
analysis of individual incomes. Because we want to better understand economic welfare at
the national level, we elect the household-level approach and hence include children.
The household-level approach has the advantage of making moot most issues around recip-
iency. Almost all households report at least some income, be it from remittances, grants,
labor market earnings, or informal activities. We have elected to work with per-capita
household incomes so as to adjust for household size. This has the obvious advantage that
it corrects for household size, but it is a somewhat blunt way of dealing with changes in
household composition over the course of the 15 years between the surveys. We have not
employed equivalence scales and, in the analysis below, simply treat all household mem-
bers equally. Table 1 reports the number of households (after applying frequency weights)
in South Africa in 1993 and 2008. From 1993 to 2008, there was an increase of about
5.2 million households in South Africa with about 4.4 million of those self-identifying as
\African."3
Over this same period, household composition changed. Table 2 gives average household
size by year and by population group. For all groups, the mean household size declined with
the most marked decline being for African households. In only 15 years, mean household
size declined from 5.30 to 3.68. This compositional shift underscores the importance of
normalizing household incomes by some measure of household size when undertaking any
3We use the population group names, African, Coloured, Asian, and White to maintain consistence with
the existing literature despite the fact that all South Africans are, in another sense, African.
6inter-temporal comparisons.
Having decided to work with household per-capita incomes, we elect to conduct most of
our analysis looking at log incomes. This has the advantage of decreasing the inuence of
outliers (and there are a handful especially in 2008) and of making our graphical analyses
more practical.
Both surveys provide sampling weights and all of our analysis employs those weights.
3 Household Incomes from 1993 to 2008
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics on the distribution of per-capita household real in-
comes (hereafter \incomes" for the sake of expositional ease) in South Africa in 1993 and
2008. Focusing rst on the top line of the table, the mean per capita income in 1993
was R10,741.4 In 2008, the comparable gure was R24,409. On the surface, this appears
an impressive increase in real incomes at the household level. Not surprisingly given the
inequality documented by other researchers, these mean gures hide huge heterogeneity in
household welfare{ both within and across population groups. The average African income
increased from R6,018 in 1993 to R9,718 in 2008 and for Coloured households, the increase
was from R7498 to R25,269{ an almost four-fold increase. For Whites, the increase was
similarly dramatic, from R29,372 to R110,195.
The standard deviation of incomes is reported in line 2 of the table and, for the population
overall, this increased about ten-fold. The within-race inequality documented in Leibbrandt
et al. (2010b) is evident in our data as well. For all population groups, the ratio of the
mean income to its standard deviation increased from 1995 to 2008.
4In 2000, the exchange rate uctuated mostly in the range of 6.5 to 7.5 Rand per US dollar.
7The bottom panel of Table 3 reports percentiles of the distribution of income both overall
and by population group. The median incomes (50th percentile) show increases that are
substantially more modest than those of mean incomes. While mean income for all South
Africans rose about 130 percent from 1993 to 2008, the median income rose just 15 percent
over the same period{ from R4444 to R5096. Especially for Whites, the increases are being
driven by a small number of very large incomes.
Another \small numbers" issue with the data concerns zero incomes that are reported in
1993. It is somewhat hard to believe that these incomes are truly zero, especially for the
White households which are more likely to report missing values. The 1993 data do, in
principle, though, account for the dierence between zero incomes and missing or non-
reported incomes.
We elect to treat the data as it stands. In Table 3, we have not deleted the huge incomes
reported nor have we set zero incomes to missing. In most of the analysis that follows,
though, we work with log incomes, and this addresses each of these issues in dierent ways.
The zero incomes are dropped and, especially given the large fraction of them that belong
to White households, this strikes us as reasonable. More importantly, the huge outliers
have diminished inuence on means when working with log incomes. Hence, by working
with log incomes, we report statistics that are both more interpretable in percentage terms
and more robust to the handful of outliers.
Table 4 reports the means and distributions of log per-capita household real incomes (here-
after \log incomes".) In 1993, the mean log income was 8.44 and it had grown to 8.58 by
2008{ a 14 percent increase in real incomes. This gure is quite close to the 15 percent
increase in median incomes found in Table 3. It is smaller than the 25 percent increase
implied by the one and a half percent average growth rate compounded over 15 years as
8indicated by the macro-data. In terms of orders of magnitude, though, the micro- and
macro-data convey very similar messages.
Again, the growth in mean log incomes was not equal across the population groups. African
households experiences a 26 percent point increase, while for Coloured households the
gure was 8 percentage points. Asian households saw a 5 percent increase and Whites' a
28 percent increase. For all groups, the standard deviation of log incomes increased over
this period.
The bottom panel of Table 4 reports percentiles. All population groups experienced in-
creases in the median log income. Examination of the entire distribution for the overall
population shows increases at each reported percentile except the rst. For African house-
holds, the rst percentile is the only one to report a decline in log real income{ all other
reported percentiles increased. For Coloured households, the gains were less pervasive.
Only the top half of the reported percentiles saw increases in real incomes. The same
was true for Asian households although this group is much smaller. Like African house-
holds, White households saw increases throughout the distribution except for the bottom
percentile.
The overall picture painted by Table 4 is one of modest but pervasive increases in real
incomes over the fteen years since the fall of Apartheid. An important exception to
this is the bottom half of the distribution of Coloured households. Anecdotes that the
Coloured population has been left behind relative to the larger African population group
are supported by the nationally representative data in Table 4. On the whole, though,
log incomes have increased. As is to be expected given the inequality in South Africa, the
increase in log incomes is but a fraction of the increase in (level) incomes.
Figures 1 and 2 display the cumulative density functions of log incomes for all South
9Africans and for African households respectively. As indicated by Table 4, Figure 1 shows
more modest gains, but it is still the case that in most (but not every) parts of the distri-
bution, log real incomes were higher in 2008. Figure 2, for African households only, shows
a more distinct pattern of increased log incomes throughout the distribution.
Figures 3 and 4 give the kernel density estimates of the income distributions for all South
Africans and for Africans-only respectively. These are presented for two reasons. First,
they better highlight relative gains of dierent segments of the income distribution. We
illustrate this point immediately below. Second, the probability density functions (as
opposed to the cumulative density functions) will serve as the basis for our investigation
of what might explain the dierences between the 1993 and 2008 distributions. We rely on
methods developed in DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) and Leibbrandt et al. (2010c)
and those methods are based on probability density functions.
We discuss the relationship between the density functions using the African-only examples
given in Figures 2 and 4. This is because the cumulative density function in Figure 2 is
easier to read than that in Figure 1. The logic is the same for the density functions for the
entire population (Figures 1 and 3.) Figure 2 showed that the cumulative density function
for 2008 lay to the right of that for 1993 indicating gains in real income throughout the
distribution. Figure 4 highlights the fact that those gains were greater for the bottom and
top third of the distribution than the were for the middle third. There is a section of the
2008 distribution, from log incomes of about 7 to log incomes of about 10 for which the
2008 distribution lies mostly to the left of that for 1993 in Figure 4. Put another way, while
real incomes were higher for African households throughout almost the entire distribution
of income, the larger gains went to the bottom and top third of the distribution.
Having documented the changes in incomes from 1993 to 2008, we now turn to an analysis
10of what explains these changes.
4 What Drives the Changes in Household Incomes?
We investigate three possible explanations for what might account for the shift in the
density functions given in Figures 2 and 4. The rst candidate is that endowments have
changed, the second that returns to those endowments changed, and the third that the
Child Support Grant explains at least the shift for the bottom half of the income distribu-
tion. Each are discussed in turn.
4.1 Does a change in endowments explain the shift in the distribution
of incomes?
To investigate the role that changes in endowments might have played in shifting the
distribution of log real incomes, we apply the approach of (DiNardo et al. 1996) (hereafter
simply DFL.) This is a nonparametric approach and as such has both advantages and
disadvantages. A key advantage is the ability to examine how a counterfactual impacts
the entire distribution of income and to do so in a way that does not impose strong
parametric assumptions (as, for example, is the case in Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973).)
A disadvantage is that the standard sort of hypothesis tests typically applied in parametric
settings are not applicable to the nonparametric approach.5
We begin by setting notation.6
5It is possible, though, to investigate the impact of a change in only one endowment as opposed to all
of them.
6The description of how the endowments counterfactual distribution is estimated draws from Leibbrandt
et al. (2010c).
11The density functions for household income in periods t and t0 may be written as
f(yjT = t) =
Z
g(yjx;T = t)h(xjT = t)dx (1)
and
f(yjT = t0) =
Z
g(yjx;T = t0)h(xjT = t0)dx (2)
respectively, where T is a random variable describing the year from which a given household
in the pooled dataset of observations from both survey years is drawn, g(yjx;T = t) is the
density of household income evaluated at y, given that the observable attributes of the
household, X, are equal to x and that the survey year is t, and h(xjT = t) is the density
of attributes evaluated at x, given that the survey year is t. It is perhaps helpful to think
of g(yjx;T = t) as the function that \translates" observable attributes into income. Were
this a traditional parametric regression of household income on household endowments for
a given year t, the density of household income, f(yjT = t), would be analogous to the
dependent variable, income; h(xjT = t) would be analogous to the endowments data; and
g(yjx;T = t) would be analogous to the returns to those endowments.
We are interested in how the density of household (log) income changes if attributes and/or
returns to those attributes changed. In this case, we are interested in how the distribution
of income in period t would dier, were the endowments as they were in period t0. That
is, what if households' endowments were those that obtained in 2008 (t0) instead of the
actual 1993 (t) endowments? We denote this counter-factual by ft!t0





g(yjx;T = t)h(xjT = t0)dx: (3)
Notationally, the subscript \h" indicates that it is the density of attributes, or h(xjT = t),
12that is being changed from an actual to a counter-factual density. The superscript, \t ! t0"
indicates that in this counter-factual, we are going to start with data from period t and use
statistical techniques, in particular a re-weighting scheme, to transform the actual density
of attributes from the h(xjT = t) that reigned in period t to the counterfactual density
h(xjT = t0) that reigned in period t0.
The key insight from DFL is that the counter-factual in (3) is easy to implement by simply
re-weighting the data. The re-weighting idea of DFL is based on the simple recognition




P(T = t0jX = x)
1   P(T = t0jX = x)
. P(T = t0)




h (x) is just the ratio of the conditional odds to the unconditional odds This
is the weighting function needed to conduct the endowments counter-factual of (3). To see





g(yjx;T = t)h(xjT = t0)dx =
Z






g(yjx;T = t)h(xjT = t)t!t0
h (x)dx (5)
which diers from (1) only by the weight t!t0
h (x). Consequently, we estimate the weighting
function t!t0
h (x) and then compute the counter-factual (3) using a re-weighted density
estimate of incomes. A recipe-style description of exactly how this is done is given in
(Leibbrandt et al. 2010c).
In order to estimate the counterfactual density, it is necessary to estimate the numerator
of (4) using a simple logit regression. This is a regression in which the dependent variable
13is an indicator for whether the year is 1993 or 2008 and the dependent variables are the
household endowments. The results of this regression are given in Table 5. Although the
sole purpose of this regression is to estimate the conditional probabilities that enter the
numerator of the DFL weight, the results are interesting in their own right.
The dependent variable is coded so that it is 1 if the year is 2008 and 0 if the year is 1993.
The results show that conditional on other regressors, household size shrank while the
fraction of households that were African increased the most followed by Coloured followed
by Asian with White households as the excluded group. All of these are consistent with
the simple correlations in the data. Other results (again conditional on other regressors)
indicate that the number of adults with formal jobs declined, the number of adults in the
household declined, the highest education level of the household rose, the likelihood that
a household member was eligible for a State Old Age Pension fell, the number of children
eligible for a Child Support Grant rose and the fraction of households that were Metro or
Urban rose (relative to those that were Rural.) Except for the number of adults in the
household, all of these variables are quite statistically signicant.7
The estimated counterfactual is given in Figure 5. This gure is for all households. The
results for only African households are quite similar. It is clear from the gure that the
endowments counterfactual does not change the upper tail of the 1993 distribution at all.
Thus, the actual improvement in incomes in the top tail by 2008 is not driven by changes
in endowments. However, the counterfactual simulation changes the shape of the rest of
the 1993 distribution fairly dramatically. The bottom two thirds of 1993 distribution shifts
to the right. This implies that for all but the top-end of the 1993 distribution, incomes
would have been greatly improved with 2008 endowments.
7There is a pretty good argument that the number of formally employed adults should not be included
as a regressor and we have replicated all results without this regressor. Results are essentially identical.
14This strong positive result is interesting because, supercially at least, the logit results
shown in Table 5 show a mixed bag of positive and negative (conditional) endowment
changes. Higher levels of urbanization, higher levels of education and smaller household
sizes are potential positives. However, the declining population share of White South
Africans, the lower numbers of employed members per household and the lower number of
members eligible for the old age pension are negative endowment changes. The fact that
the counterfactual distribution shifts well past the actual 2008 distribution implies that, in
reality, some other factors oest the impact of these improved 2008 endowments. Actual
income changes in the bottom tail were much smaller than simulated and improvements
in the middle of the distribution did not happen at all. The change in the returns to
these endowments is one such factor that could either accentuate or counter-balance the
endowments eect and we now turn to this issue.
4.2 Does a change in returns explain the shift in the distribution of
incomes?
An alternative explanation is that the returns to a household's endowments have changed
from 1993 to 2008. Just as it was possible to simulate what the entire distribution of
incomes would have been if returns were constant but endowments changed, one can simu-
late what the distribution of household incomes would be if endowments were constant but
returns were those that obtained in 2008. We do just this using the methodology developed
in Leibbrandt et al. (2010c).
We label this counter-factual by ft!t0




g(yjx;T = t0)h(xjT = t)dx (6)




P(T = t0jX = x;Y = y)
1   P(T = t0jX = x;Y = y)
. P(T = t0jX = x)
1   P(T = t0jX = x)
 t!t0
g (x;y) (7)




g(yjx;T = t0)h(xjT = t)dx =
Z






g(yjx;T = t)h(xjT = t)t!t0
g (x;y)dx (8)
In practice, estimation of the weight given in (7) requires estimating the same logit as used
in the endowments counterfactual and an additional logit regression in which household
income is included both as a regressor itself and also interacted with all the included
household attributes.
In previous work ((Leibbrandt et al. 2010c)), the returns counterfactual showed that returns
to endowments played a major role in explaining the change in the distribution of individual
incomes between 1995 and 2000. However, the counterfactual distribution at the household
level that is shown in Figure 6 makes it clear that simulating a change in returns for the
1993 distribution had very little impact on the distribution. As with the endowment
simulation, there is no change to the upper tail of the 1993 distribution. Thus the actual
improvement in incomes at the top end in 2008 is explained by neither endowments nor
returns to endowments.8 The counterfactual shifts the lower tail of the 1993 distribution to
the right, but not as signicantly as the actual rightward shift in the density between 1993
and 2008. Nonetheless, this lowering of mass in the density at the bottom is accommodated
8This nding is probably due to a violation of the common support assumption underlying the nonpara-
metric approaches.
16by some improvements in the middle of the distribution.
4.3 Does the Child Support Grant explain the shift in the distribution
of incomes?
Over the entire post-apartheid period the State Old Age Pension has formed the central
plank of an extensive social security system. See Case and Deaton (1998) for an early
analysis of this. Over eighty percent of the elderly receive this pension. However, as this
pension has been in place over the entire period at roughly constant real values, it is unlikely
to have been responsible for major changes in the distribution of income. A new grant, the
Child Support Grant (CSG) was introduced in April 1998. It initially provided R100 for
every child in the household younger than seven years of age. Over time, it became both
more generous (the grant is rose to R240 per child) and more pervasive as the means test
was relaxed and the age below which a child qualied was raised to 15 in January 2008. By
April 2009, 9.1 million children were beneting from Child Support Grants.9 In short, in
the period between 1993 and 2008, the Child Support Grant became a signicant income
source for poorer households. In this section, we investigate the role the CSG might have
played in explaining the dierence in the distribution of real household incomes.
The returns explanation begins to address this issue because we have included the number
of children who would qualify for the CSG as a household \endowment" or attribute. The
CSG acts to increase the return to this household attribute. It is not possible, though, to
estimate the counterfactual density that would obtain if the return to only one attribute
changed.10
In order to investigate the impact of the CSG alone, we have simply computed what
9This gure is from Treasury (2010).
10The reason for this is explained in detail in Leibbrandt et al. (2010c).
17household incomes would have been but-for the CSG by subtracting this source of income
from 2008 household incomes. The results are reported in Figure 7. This gure gives
the level of income for incomes below the median 2008 household income (including the
CSG.)
Figure 7 shows that the CSG has played an important role in increasing incomes for
poorer households. By comparing the actual 2008 density from that which would obtain
but for the CSG, it is clear that while the CSG has beneted all income levels below
the median, the benet is larger the poorer the household. This is evidenced by the fact
that the gap between the actual and but-for-the-CSG incomes is larger the poorer the
household. Indeed, without the CSG, there would have been about three times as many
households reporting zero incomes.11 For most income levels in Figure 7, the but-for-the-
CSG density lies below the 1993 density. This suggests that the CSG more than explains
the income gains by households below the median income level. We conclude that the CSG
has played an important role in explaining why incomes increased for the bottom half of
households.
5 Conclusions: Elements of success but is it sustainable go-
ing forward?
This paper is based on national household surveys conducted in 1993 and 2008. These years
mark the start and the end of the rst fteen years of post-Apartheid South Africa. The
data are constructed so as to insure that that the two years are comparable. What does this
comparison show? The data show an increase in average per capita real incomes. For the
11Figure 7 is presented in levels rather than in logs so as to make this point. The issue of zero incomes
is brushed aside when working with log incomes.
18most part, this increase is evident across the distribution. This means that growth has been
shared, albeit unequally, across almost the entire spectrum of incomes. This is especially
true for the African group that makes up close to eighty per cent of the population. We
cite evidence from other researchers that this income improvement was accompanied by
strong improvements in access to important services such as water, housing and electricity.
Thus, there are elements of genuine success.
However, as the kernel density estimations that we present make clear, these real income
changes are not dramatic. The increases are modest and the densities hint at the fact
inequality has increased. Our research and that of others conrm that the very high levels
of inequality that apartheid bequeathed the incoming government in 1994 have increased
even further. Also, rising unemployment makes it clear that the labor market has been a
problem rather than part of the solution over the last fteen years.
We conduct a series of semi-parametric decompositions in order to see if we can better
understand the source of the shifts in the distribution of incomes. These decompositions
look at the role of changes in endowments and changes in the returns to these endowments
in driving the observed changes in the income distribution between 1993 and 2008. This
analysis proves to be very useful in highlighting the positive role played by changes in
endowments over the period. Indeed the resulting endowments counterfactual indicates
that, if these endowment changes were all that changed in South Africa over the post-
apartheid period, we would have seen a pervasive rightward shift of the distribution of
per capita real incomes. This contrasts sharply with the actual shifts in the densities;
which show clear improvements only at the bottom and the top of the densities. This is an
important nding as it highlights the fact that the strong spending by the state on education
and services, led to measurable improvements in levels of education and access to essential
services but these improved endowments did not translate into generalized increases in real
19incomes. Therefore, something dampened the translation between improved endowments
and improved real incomes. Our semi-parametric analysis of returns indicates that, at
the household level, this dampening was not due to a pernicious change in returns to
endowments. Ceteris paribus, the change in returns makes a small positive contribution
to the bottom and middle sections of the distribution. Unfortunately, the semi-parametric
analysis is not able to assess the impact of changes in returns to each separate endowment.
This is a pity as the evidence coming from the analysis of individual earnings in the labor
market (e.g. Banerjee, Galiani, Levinsohn, McLaren and Woolard (2008)) is that there
has been a skills twist in the returns to education in South Africa that has lowered the
returns to education for all but the highest levels of schooling. This includes the incomplete
secondary school years where the greatest gains have been made in post-apartheid South
Africa.
From the advent of the post-apartheid period, South Africa has always had an extensive
social welfare system based on a large state old age pension. This pension persisted through
the post-apartheid years but has not been extended signicantly. There has been one major
extension to the welfare system; from 1998 onwards a child support grant was implemented
with very high take up in the middle 2000s. In our semi-parametric framework this would
change the returns to the endowment of the number of young children in the household.
While we cannot isolate the impact of this change within the semi-parametric framework,
we run a simple with CSG/without CSG simulation that shows just how important CSG
income is to the lower part of the distribution of per-capita real incomes.
This is suggestive of the fact that it is the system of social grants in general and the new
support coming from the child support grant in particular that counterbalances a strongly
negative set of changes coming from the labor market. The strong social spending on
social services, education and health have a potentially positive role to play. However,
20our evidence suggests that they are yet to generate broad-based income returns. The net
eect of all of these changes is a positive increase in real incomes over the post-apartheid
period.
Figure 8 and table 5 taken together reiterate the point that this increase in real incomes
is the net outcome of some strongly positive and some strongly negative forces. Figure
8 presents social expenditures over the post-apartheid period and extrapolates these ex-
penditures into the next few years. It retells the remarkable story of the expansion of the
social grants and also the large (by international standards) expenditures on education and
health. As shown by the debt service gures, one of the accomplishments of South African
government policy over the period has been that these expenditure expansions were ac-
complished while bringing down the daunting public debt that the apartheid state handed
over to the new South African democracy.
It is exactly this combination of cash transfers and the expansion of education that is cred-
ited with the reduction of inequality in Brazil and Mexico since 2000. However, as we have
shown, inequality has risen not fallen in South Africa. The key dierence between the Latin
American and the South African experiences seems to be that social grants and improved
levels of education accompanied and contributed towards strong employment creation in
Latin America whereas this employment creation has not happened in South Africa. Table
6 shows this quite vividly. It can be seen that even in 1993 high unemployment rates
were the marker of those in the lowest deciles. By 2008 unemployment rates rise across all
deciles and they rise particularly sharply in the bottom half of the distribution. Taken in
isolation this table does not accord with a society generating positive, inclusive economic
growth and social stability.
It is this balance that makes it hard to be unequivocally positive. The post-apartheid
21state has clearly been pro-active. However, other than through the generation of rising
tax revenues, this appears to have failed to generate virtuous interactions with the real
economy. Indeed the global nancial crisis has sharpened these dilemmas. It can be seen
in gure 8 that the debt service is starting to rise again. This is a reection of the fact that
the growing budget decits are being generated in order to nance the states expenditure
programs.
While real spending on social grants has been protected, it has not continued to grow.
To some extent this is due to the tighter nancial conditions. However, this is also due
to a growing recognition that these grants cannot be expanded indenitely. Woolard and
Leibbrandt (2010) review a large corpus showing that these unconditional transfers result
in many virtuous behavioral eects. These studies certainly justify the state's program
over the last fteen years to expand these grants to where they are now; one of the largest
programs in the world. However, with the state old age pension being larger than the
median per capita income and with this pension and the child support grant making up the
dominant share of income for those in the lowest deciles, there are also grounds for worrying
about the further expansion of these grants. For one thing, the grants are specically
targeted at the elderly, the disabled and children and rely on a set of indirect behavioral
responses to connect to the labour market. Policies that directly address the labour market
have to be the rst priority.
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1 Unit of observation is the self-reported
household.
2 Rates are calculated using sample
weights.






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































27Table 5: Logit Regression for Reweighting
Variable Coecient Standard Error z
Household Size -.211995 .039686 -5.34
African 1.473985 .060685 24.29
Coloured 1.155165 .083275 13.87
Asian .9407829 .1223874 7.69
Number w/ Formal Jobs -.6269353 .0277821 -22.57
Number of Adults -.0474666 .0446675 -1.06
Highest Education in HH .1236585 .0062593 19.76
Gender of HH Head -.3668922 .042225 -8.69
SOAP eligible -.1605647 .0366606 -4.38
Number of children under 14 .1361046 .0438766 3.10
Urban .858294 .0509862 16.83
Metro 1.586205 .0511592 31.01
Constant -.5383919 .1522273 -3.54
1 Dependent Variable is a 1 if year is 2008, 0 if 1993.
2 Whites are the excluded population group.
3 Highest Education is given in years.
4 Rural is the excluded region-type category.
28Table 6: Unemployment
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Figure 2: Household Income CDF's{ African Only
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Figure 7: The \Child Support Grant" Explanation
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